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THE TIME HAS COME FOR DISAGGREGATED SOVEREIGN
BANKRUPTCY†
Odette Lienau*
INTRODUCTION
With expanding global vaccinations and the potential end of the COVID-19
pandemic in sight, who among us has not succumbed to daydreams of post-crisis
‘normal’ life? Still—and setting aside for now the certain obstacles on any road
to public and economic health—we should not be too sanguine about the degree
to which the eventual recovery will be even, including across countries. By now,
the images of economic dislocation resulting from the pandemic, including
empty tourist beaches, deserted town centers, and closed manufacturing plants,
have become commonplace. In certain regions and countries, this dislocation
and its after-effects may prove long-lasting, putting the world at risk for a postpandemic sovereign debt crisis.
In this Essay, I provide an overview of some of the key developments that
have emerged in the sovereign debt space in the wake of the COVID-19
pandemic and argue that we should use the energy generated in this moment to
move toward what might be called ‘disaggregated sovereign bankruptcy,’ in part
by establishing institutions that could more effectively and efficiently address
future crises as they arise. I first note the country financial difficulties generated
by the current situation and emphasize the ways in which national responses may
have long-term financial impacts that make states more vulnerable to debt
distress, particularly in the developing world. I also delineate how any
restructuring efforts that might result from such distress would have to contend
with longstanding problems in the global architecture relevant to sovereign debt.
These difficulties have hardly disappeared and may even have become more
complex in recent years.

†
The penultimate version of this Essay formed part of the basis for written testimony for a Congressional
hearing on Chinese Lending and the International Debt Architecture, held by the House Committee on Financial
Services Subcommittee on National Security, International Development and Monetary Policy on May 18, 2021.
A portion of the research initially was conducted as part of a consultancy with the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) on the possibility of establishing a Global Debt Authority. Such an organization,
mentioned in the text, remains under consideration and is and slated for possible international discussion in the
future. My thanks to the editors of the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal for inviting my contribution to
this special issue on recent developments, and to the participants of the Journal’s March 2021 Workshop for
helpful feedback.
*
Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Intellectual Life, Cornell Law School.
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I then mention several proposals that have been put forward to address the
pandemic-related financial crisis, formulated by scholars and policymakers to
deal with problems already present or likely to emerge.1 These ideas should, if
fully implemented, help to address countries’ financial distress in the short-tomedium term. However, the general reaction to such proposals2 by private
creditor groups and others has made the existing gaps in the international
financial architecture even more apparent. If anything, recent crisis efforts and
creditor responses3 suggest that—in addition to short-term, emergency-focused
proposals—the need for a more rational global debt restructuring platform
remains. As such, the fact of the ongoing and fast-moving public health and
economic situation does not mean that we should exclusively focus on
emergency-level solutions. Indeed, it remains imperative to harness the crisis
energy to move in the opposite direction—toward putting in place longer-term
institutions that will be ready for the next crisis and, perhaps, make that next
crisis less likely or less intense.
Finally, I lay out more fully that the time has come for ‘disaggregated
sovereign bankruptcy’—which can be understood as a framework by which
multiple processes at varying levels simultaneously support or instantiate a
shared set of sovereign debt resolution principles and commitments. Although
numerous actors have called for a full-blown multilateral treaty-based
restructuring regime, most famously the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
the early 2000s,4 such proposals have thus far met with resistance.
Improvements in market-based, contractually grounded solutions have taken
some of the pressure off, but still leave many problems un- or under-addressed.
Although the narrative of voluntary, market-based advancements versus
‘involuntary’ (or perhaps less voluntary) international statutory options offers a
neatly binary conceptual package, it is well past time to abandon such overly
simplistic framing. Improvements in the contractual realm, in the multilateral
1
See COVID 19: Debt Service Suspension Initiative, WORLD BANK (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.
worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-initiative (explaining that, in response to
the economic crisis surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, “the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund urged G20 countries to establish the Debt Service Suspension Initiative [DSSI]” for the purpose of “helping
countries concentrate their resources on fighting the pandemic and safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of
millions of the most vulnerable people”); G20, Common Framework for Debt Treatments Beyond the DSSI,
PARIS CLUB (Nov. 2020).
2
See, e.g., Inst. for Int’l Fin., Terms of Reference for Potential Private Sector Participation in the
G20/Paris Club Debt Suspension Initiative (May 28, 2020), https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/
Regulatory/Voluntary%20Private%20Sector%20Terms%20of%20Reference%20for%20DSSI_vf.pdf.
3
See COVID 19: Debt Service Suspension Initiative, WORLD BANK (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.
worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-initiative; Inst. for Int’l Fin., supra note 2.
4
ANNE O. KRUEGER, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 31 (2002), https://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.
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arena, and at the level of domestic legislation should be conceived of as
complementary rather than competitive. Or, if these arenas may sometimes
compete, we should understand this as the type of healthy competition that
ultimately results in better outcomes; there is no need to champion one approach
over another.
To be clear, the explicit embrace of a more disaggregated framework for
implementing debt resolution principles need not be disorganized. As such, I
also argue in favor of establishing an international body purpose-built to
recommend, coordinate, and facilitate steady, incremental progress in the
architecture for dealing with sovereign debt across multiple vectors. In this, it
endorses an idea floated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in the first half of 2020, and still under development,
and also echoes earlier calls for a relatively modest but still internationally
relevant forum.5 Instead of a full-blown multilateral body with adjudicative
functions, a more pragmatically achievable organization could be proposed and
implemented, perhaps even by a small group of states and supporters, in order
to serve as a focal point for ongoing activities designed to improve how the
global community collectively deals with debt in the short, medium, and long
term. Although any such organization may not be able to deal with the
immediate financial fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, advocates of more
rational debt restructuring should not waste the sense of urgency present in the
current crisis. We need to take steps now to adopt an infrastructure that would
make future debt crises less severe and perhaps less likely—even when the
spotlights are directed elsewhere.
I.

FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY, COUNTRY RESPONSES, AND SOVEREIGN
DEBT DISTRESS

Although the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic has been well
documented, several elements are especially important in thinking through its
potential ramifications for international debtor-creditor relations. To begin with,
factors that have led to decreased revenue and foreign exchange may have a
lingering impact in the sovereign debt space. The drop in key export commodity
prices for many countries has had a significant blow, along with the fall in global
trade generally.6 The near freeze in the international tourism industry dried up a
5
In a somewhat similar vein, though more circumscribed, a recent G30 Report called for a consultative
mechanism attached to the G20’s Common Framework. G30, SOVEREIGN DEBT AND FINANCING FOR RECOVERY
AFTER THE COVID-19 SHOCK: NEXT STEPS TO BUILD A BETTER ARCHITECTURE 3, 23 (2021).
6
See, e.g., Constantino Hevia & Andy Neumeyer, A Perfect Storm: COVID-19 in Emerging Economies,
in COVID-19 IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 25, 25, 31 (Simeon Djankov & Ugo Panizza eds., 2020) (arguing that
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key source of foreign exchange in certain regions.7 And, for some countries, the
significant decline in remittance flows from overseas workers, resulting from
economic stagnation in remittance source countries, has constituted a significant
hardship as well.8 Given that many countries continue to denominate their
external debt in foreign currency over which they have no control, these factors
put together have meant that their capacity to service such debt has plummeted.
In addition, government expenditures have tended to rise steeply as a result
of the pandemic, exacerbating the problems caused by the increased costs of
international debt servicing, particularly in terms of certain local currencies.9
The healthcare costs involved in addressing the crisis have been significant,
especially where preventative measures proved insufficient or failed to gain
wide adherence.10 Expenditures on unemployment have increased as many
people struggled with pandemic-driven economic dislocation and turned to the
state for assistance.11 In countries with a significant reliance on global trade for
key commodities, food security and related issues emerged as a real concern.12
The World Bank estimated that 150 million people globally had been placed at
risk of extreme poverty as a result of the pandemic, with global extreme poverty
expected to rise for the first time in twenty years.13

“developing countries will be harder hit by the pandemic than advanced economies”).
7
See Simeon Djankov & Ugo Panizza, Developing Economies After COVID-19: An Introduction, in
COVID-19 IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 8, 8, 9 (2020) (stating that, throughout the COVID-19 pandemic,
developing countries are facing “large negative economic shocks” linked, in part, to collapses in their respective
tourist industries).
8
See Hevia & Neumeyer, supra note 6, at 25, 31 (discussing the negative economic impacts of COVID19 in countries with emerging economies and arguing that a COVID-induced increase in unemployment in
countries with advanced economies “will reduce immigrant remittances to their home countries”).
9
See Djankov & Panizza, supra note 7, at 8, 20 (discussing how “local currency bonds issued by
emerging market countries have been hit particularly hard by the Covid-19 pandemic” as government
expenditures and debts continue to rise).
10
See Sarah M. Bartsch et al., The Potential Health Care Costs and Resource Use Associated with
COVID-19 in the United States, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 927, 934 (2020) (discussing the causes and effects of health
care spending in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic).
11
See David Laborde, Will Martin & Rob Vos, Poverty and Food Insecurity Could Grow Dramatically
as COVID-19 Spreads, IFPRI BLOG: RESEARCH POST (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.ifpri.org/blog/poverty-andfood-insecurity-could-grow-dramatically-covid-19-spreads (explaining how mandatory lockdowns and business
closures caused unemployment to skyrocket around the world during the COVID-19 pandemic).
12
Id.
13
Press Release, World Bank, COVID-19 to Add as Many as 150 Million Extreme Poor by 2021 (Oct.
7, 2020), (available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/10/07/covid-19-to-add-as-manyas-150-million-extreme-poor-by2021#:~:text=The%20COVID%2D19%20pandemic%20is,severity%20of%20the%20economic%20contractio
n).
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Countries rightfully took measures to address this risk, and in some cases
have turned to new debt as a cushion, leading to historically high public debt
levels.14 Particularly given low interest rates and increased liquidity, private
entities have also partaken in the liquidity buffet, further fueling the massive rise
in overall global debt levels.15 Although such private entity debt does not
directly impact sovereign state balance sheets, at least for now, in certain
industries and for certain countries such debt may still end up as sovereign
obligations if states are faced with the risk of struggling financial, infrastructure,
or other systemic sectors down the line. In short, it is entirely understandable
that countries and private actors alike have sought to mitigate the effects of the
pandemic in any way possible. However, the aggregated impact of these national
responses and private decisions may have long-term financial ramifications that
make countries more vulnerable to debt distress.
It is important to point out that countries’ (and individuals’) exposure to
pandemic-related challenges has been incredibly uneven, with World Bank
President David Malpass warning of an “inequality pandemic” coming on the
heels of the public health crisis.16 States faced the crisis from different starting
points, including in terms of basic economic strength and healthcare capacity.
Furthermore, countries had different external borrowing costs and levels of
reliance on international transactions to begin with.17 This meant, and continues
to mean, that the long-term economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic,
including the possibility of debt crises, will inevitably vary considerably across
countries. Particularly for some, the risk of sovereign debt distress resulting from
COVID-19 is real, and in certain situations already present, and it may prove
long-lasting.18

14
See John Letzing, Countries Are Piling on Record Amounts of Debt Amid COVID-19. Here’s What
That Means, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/11/covid-19-hascountries-borrowing-money-just-about-as-quickly-as-they-can-print-it/.
15
See Liz Capo McCormick et al., The Covid-19 Pandemic Has Added $19.5 Trillion to Global Debt:
Here Are Reasons to Be Grateful—and Worried, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021coronavirus-global-debt/ (using data and charts to demonstrate how an increase in private debt that occurred in
2020 contributed to an overall rise in global debt amidst the COVID-19 pandemic).
16
See David Malpass, President, World Bank Grp., Speech at Frankfurt School of Finance and
Management: Reversing the Inequality Pandemic (Oct. 5, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.worldbank.
org/en/news/speech/2020/10/05/reversing-the-inequality-pandemic-speech-by-world-bank-group-presidentdavid-malpass).
17
See Hevia & Neumeyer, supra note 6, at 25, 31 (discussing the varying financial circumstances facing
different countries before and during the COVID-19 pandemic).
18
See generally Ben Parker, The Debt Crisis Looming for Poor Countries, THE NEW HUMANITARIAN
(Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/10/08/pandemic-debt-crisis-looms (“The
World Bank and the IMF list Mozambique as one of eight countries in ‘debt distress’, while 28 others were
considered at ‘high risk’ as of June.”)
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II. THE COMPOUNDING PROBLEMS OF LONG-TERM TRENDS AND
RESTRUCTURING INSUFFICIENCIES
What kind of financial architecture is in place for dealing with debt crises
when they appear and especially when they linger? While I discuss below the
shorter-term international emergency measures taken and proposed in response
to the pandemic, the background prognosis for longer-running crises is not
especially encouraging. In particular, a brief review of the key challenges and
recent trends underscores why debt crises and restructuring episodes may prove
tenacious, especially once the headlines and emergency funds have moved on.
To begin with, the broad range of creditors, lending instruments, and local
and international forums implicated in the sovereign arena has long fragmented
this realm of debtor-creditor relations. Although official sector negotiations and
private sector restructurings generally follow well-trodden pathways, with
principles of comparability of treatment linking the two areas, issues of
inequitable creditor outcomes and inconsistent legal interpretations remain. And
recent trends have only exacerbated this fragmentation, particularly given the
expanded range of creditors and financial instruments now implicated in
sovereign debt. Whereas in the 1990s and through the early 2000s, sovereign
bonds were by far the dominant private instrument, other forms of commercial
lending have become more common, as have loans from hybrid public-private
investors such as sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises.19 This
fragmentation is further exacerbated by the steep increase since the Global
Financial Crisis in developing countries’ private indebtedness, which constitutes
another important vulnerability and complication.20 In addition, there has been
a rise in collateralized lending,21 in which creditors have recourse to specific
assets in the event of nonpayment. Those assets thus may be removed from the
general pool available to repay creditors in any broader restructuring. Even
among bilateral and semi-official creditors, a number of non-Paris Club creditor
countries, especially China,22 have become dominant, particularly in certain
regions. This has made it even more challenging to achieve a comprehensive
19
For an overview of recent trends, see, e.g., International Monetary Fund, The Evolution of Public Debt
Vulnerabilities in Lower Income Economies 1, 7–17 (2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/
Issues/2020/02/05/The-Evolution-of-Public-Debt-Vulnerabilities-In-Lower-Income-Economies-49018.
20
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Report on Financing a Global Green New Deal, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2019 74–83 (Sept. 25, 2019).
21
See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public
Lenders and Borrowers 1, 4 (2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/02/19/
Collateralized-Transactions-Key-Considerations-for-Public-Lenders-and-Borrowers-49063.
22
For a recent and thorough look at certain aspects of Chinese lending practices, see ANNA GELPERN ET
AL., HOW CHINA LENDS: A RARE LOOK INTO 100 DEBT CONTRACTS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (2021).
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restructuring agreement that includes all creditors and is likely to provide
sufficient and long-lasting relief consistent with sustainable and equitable
development. Overall, these shifts have resulted in a complex context for any
post-pandemic debt restructuring to come.
Indeed, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the past debt restructurings that have
emerged from this framework tend to be “too little, too late”—providing
countries with tardy and insufficient relief that undermines their return to
economic health. Sovereign borrower states often delay the decision to
restructure due to a range of factors that may include lack of information,
electoral concerns, and worries about financial contagion. Creditors’ reluctance
to face the possibility of losses, and the difficulty of dealing with collective
action complications, mean that incentive problems exist on both sides.
Creditors and international actors may also express moral hazard concerns in
explaining resistance, and certain creditors have asserted that voluntary
restructuring conflicts with their obligations to shareholders, investors, or
regulators.23 And, once a decision to restructure is made, insufficiently deep
restructurings can result from overly optimistic growth forecasts or concerns
about reputation. Although debt restructurings are almost inevitably difficult and
politically tense, any perceptions that they are also non-transparent, inequitable,
and illegitimate can intensify civil strife and thus make them even more
disruptive. Such second-order disruption can exacerbate the distress already
generated by the restructuring itself.24
Although progress toward more comprehensive and equitable restructuring
has been made through both contractual developments and, in some cases,
domestic legislative action, such progress remains highly incomplete. The
International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) developed a model clause in
2014 that offers a menu of alternative voting procedures, including a “single
limb” option under which a single aggregated vote can be taken across all
applicable bonds.25 Although the use of such clauses has become dominant
(though not universal) in United Kingdom and New York law bonds, there has
been no uptake in other geographical regions.26 These other regions are
23

See, e.g., Inst. for Int’l Fin., supra note 2.
For more on the challenge and potential benefit of legitimate restructurings, and on how ‘legitimacy’
might be understood in the sovereign debt context, see Odette Lienau, The Challenge of Legitimacy in Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 151, 154–55 (2016).
25
In addition, the model clause offers a clarification that pari passu language does not provide holdout
creditors with ratable payment, which was at issue in the long-running Argentina litigation under New York
Law. Natalie A. Turchi, Note, Restructuring a Sovereign Bond Pari Passu Work-Around: Can Holdout Creditors
Ever Have Equal Treatment?, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2171, 2208 (2015).
26
International Monetary Fund, Fourth Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual
24
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admittedly currently far less significant in terms of bond issuances, but they do
include financial centers likely to become more prominent over time. And
although the outstanding global debt stock without these enhanced Collective
Action Clauses (CACs) should decline over time, it remains substantial.27
In addition, part of the risk with contract-based innovations is that they may
be undone in subsequent rounds of negotiation. Although the enhanced CACs
seem well established, the August 2020 restructuring process for Argentina’s
bonds included a creditor proposal to leave out the enhanced CACs in the future
restructured bonds.28 In short, although contractually based progress certainly
helps, it is hardly foolproof—particularly when coverage is incomplete, and
when it is not backed up by complementary initiatives supporting collective
action. In terms of statutory efforts, several jurisdictions, most notably the
United Kingdom and Belgium, have passed domestic legislation designed to
address holdout creditors and protect market infrastructure (such as payment
systems) from collection efforts. However, this approach is hardly widespread.
Overall, the background architecture available to deal with any post-pandemic
sovereign debt crisis that might linger does not look especially promising.
III. THE SHORT-TERM FOCUS OF COVID-19 SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
DISCUSSIONS
In light of this unpromising background, what proposals have been taken up
at the international level thus far? The pandemic-related stresses that countries
face, in terms of increased expenditures and drops in revenue and debt-servicing
capacity, are well understood. Unsurprisingly and appropriately, key measures
have tended to focus heavily on dealing with the immediate emergency rather
than on efforts to prevent and ease the cycle of sovereign debt crises more
generally. These international initiatives have relieved some of the immediate
Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts 1, 4–5 (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/03/21/Fourth-Progress-Report-on-Inclusion-of-Enhanced-ContractualProvisions-in-International-46671.
27
Id. at 7.
28
See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Robert Howse & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereign Creditors Must Not
Rewrite the Rules During the Pandemic, PROJECT SYNDICATE (July 9, 2020), https://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/argentina-sovereign-debt-rules-creditors-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-et-al-2020-07?barrier=accesspay
log#:~:text=Sovereign%20Creditors%20Must%20Not%20Rewrite%20the%20Rules%20During%20the%20Pa
ndemic,-Jul%209%2C%202020&text=In%20the%20circumstances%20caused%20by,face%20risks%20of%
20sovereign%20default (arguing that “[i]f Argentina acceded to the demands of a group of hold-out creditors, it
would create a disastrous precedent that would set back by more than a decade the development of the
international legal architecture for sovereign debt.”); see Lee Buchheit, Leland Goss & Brad Setser, Virtual
Panel on Sovereign Debt Restructuring, YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
w88s4aJmK_c (discussing CAC use in the recent restructurings of Ecuador and Argentina).
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pressure, and others would be helpful if taken up, but they remain insufficient
for the long run.
The core crisis response has centered around the G20 Debt Service
Suspension Initiative (DSSI), first proposed and adopted in April 2020 and
currently extended until December 2021 and expanded through the G20’s
November 2020 announcement of the Common Framework for Debt Treatments
Beyond the DSSI (Common Framework).29 The basic DSSI approach allowed a
range of Lower Income Countries (LICs) to request suspension of debt payments
to bilateral official creditors (i.e. creditor countries).30 This did not restructure
debt, but rather temporarily suspended payment, with interest accruing; it also
did not include suspension of payments to private creditors or to official
multilateral creditors like the IMF and World Bank.31 The Common Framework
allows for restructuring in more extreme situations, but still applies only to the
same limited set of countries—which is much narrower than the range of
countries likely to face debt distress.32 It does mandate an IMF Program and
requires participating countries to request comparability of treatment from
private creditors, although exceptions may be possible.33
To further ease the stress on countries, the G20 economies have also recently
agreed to a new allocation of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)—a key IMF
mechanism for injecting liquidity into the global economy.34 This could alleviate
some of the pressure for struggling economies, and could also pave the way for
the adoption of additional proposals to address countries’ longer-run debt
burdens, such as voluntary debt buybacks and debt swaps, perhaps through the
establishment of new central credit facilities.35 That said, the current structure of
29
G20, supra note 1; see FITCH RATINGS, THE G20 COMMON FRAMEWORK AND PRIVATE-SECTOR
RESTRUCTURING (2021).
30
Daniel Munevar, The G20 “Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI”: Is It Bound
to Fail? Part 1, EURODAD (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.eurodad.org/the_g20_common_framework_for_debt_
treatments_beyond_the_dssi_is_it_bound_to_fail.
31
Id.
32
G20, supra note 1.
33
G20, supra note 1; see FITCH RATINGS, supra note 29.
34
See Big Economies Agree to Boost IMF Funding, Georgieva Says, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/africa-imf/update-2-big-economies-agree-to-boost-imf-funding-georgievasays-idUSL5N2L056W. The last allocation of SDRs happened in 2009 in response to the Global Financial Crisis.
For those seeking more general background, the IMF semi-regularly updates an SDR Q&A. Questions and
Answers on Special Drawing Rights, IMF (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/special-drawingright.
35
See, e.g., Patrick Bolton et al., How to Prevent a Sovereign Debt Disaster: A Relief Plan for Emerging
Markets, FOREIGN AFF. (June 4, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-06-04/howprevent-sovereign-debt-disaster (recommending that debtor interest payments be routed to a central credit
facility in which creditors could receive a stake; also discussed and elaborated in related publications); Matthew
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SDR allocations means that they may not be sufficient or sufficiently targeted,
given that they are distributed according to member country IMF voting shares
and as such could go primarily to wealthier countries absent further steps.36
Ultimately, although these initiatives deserve support, liquidity injections,
temporary debt suspensions, and only tentative efforts at restructuring may not
be enough to handle the scale of debt distress that countries face.
The last year has also highlighted the degree to which even urgent
circumstances and emergency measures are unable to overcome the
longstanding problems of the sovereign debt arena. For one thing, the highly
reluctant (or nonexistent) participation of private creditors means that countries
will likely receive less restructuring than they need. Toward the beginning of the
pandemic, private sector creditors were “called upon” to participate in debt
suspensions in line with the DSSI, but declined to respond to the call despite the
exigent pandemic situation.37 The Institute for International Finance (IIF), a key
international private creditor industry group, issued an unencouraging statement
in May 2020 indicating that any private sector participation should be entirely
voluntary, net present value neutral, and arranged on a creditor-by-creditor (or
at least debt contract-by-debt contract) basis.38 A September 2020 letter further
emphasized commitment to market solutions, sanctity of contracts, resistance to
top-down approaches, and the risks of losing private market access.39 This stance
Fisher & Adnan Mazarei, A Possible IMF Pandemic Support Facility for Emerging-Market Countries,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 1, 1 (July 2020), https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/pb2011.pdf (advocating the establishment of a specialized IMF Pandemic Support Facility); Hamid Rashid & Joseph
Stiglitz, Averting Catastrophic Debt Crisis in Developing Countries, CTR. ECON. POL’Y RSCH. 1, 3 (2020),
https://cepr.org/active/
publications/policy_insights/viewpi.php?pino=104 (recommending a multilateral buyback facility that could be
managed through the IMF’s New Arrangements to Borrow function).
36
See, e.g., Hannah Wanjie Ryder & Gyude Moore, When Special Drawing Rights Aren’t So Special,
PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-sdrs-can-help-developingcountries-by-hannah-ryder-1-and-gyude-moore-2021-03. In her March 3, 2021 address to the G20, IMF
Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva suggested ways to redirect the liquidity more to countries in need, and
the ultimate IMF proposal for the allocation will presumably include some of these elements. Big Economies
Agree to Boost IMF Funding, Georgieva Says, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/africaimf/update-2-big-economies-agree-to-boost-imf-funding-georgieva-says-idUSL5N2L056W. The final allocation would
then have to be approved by major states, most notably the United States, though Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen
and other key officials have signaled their support. Andrea Shalal & David Lawder, Yellen Backs New Allocation
of IMF’s SDR Currency to Help Poor Nations, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/usg20-usa/yellen-backs-new-allocation-of-imfs-sdr-currency-to-help-poor-nations-idUSKBN2AP1U0.
37
Andrea Shalal, Pandemic Debt Relief Needs Private-Sector Involvement: IIF, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-debt-iif/pandemic-debt-relief-needs-private-sectorinvolvement-iif-idUSKCN21R2L6.
38
Inst. for Int’l Fin., supra note 2.
39
Letter from Timothy Adams, IIF President and CEO, to Mohammed Al-Jadaan, Minister of Fin.,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Sept. 22, 2020) (on file with author).
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means that public sector forbearance could indirectly support the ongoing
repayment of non-participating private sector loans, and also multilateral loans,
in another instance of sovereign debt’s well-known free-rider problem, although
the Common Framework’s comparability of treatment requirement should
help.40 Such a dynamic may make official sector or state-affiliated creditors—
particularly those from regions outside the home base of most private
investors—more reluctant to participate in relief efforts themselves. Indeed, the
relative reticence of non-Paris Club official creditors and semi-official entity
affiliates in these discussions is discouraging. These and similar collective action
problems could well undermine the ultimate scale of the relief, rendering it far
less ameliorative than the current situation warrants.41
Setting aside the lukewarm reaction by some key actors to even these modest
proposals, they are a start, and other circulating ideas deserve further cultivation
and extension. Unfortunately, one drawback of the thinking and writing inspired
by any emergency is that the intensive discussion sometimes lasts only as long
as the crisis itself. If past emergency experiences are any indication, not all of
the worthy measures proposed will be taken up. The international policy and
scholarly community may put aside these ideas once the current moment has
passed, shelving them indefinitely on working paper websites or online article
repositories.
IV. EYES ON THE PRIZE: TOWARD DISAGGREGATED SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY
Although the attention paid to immediate crisis alleviation is entirely
understandable, it would be short-sighted to focus exclusively on emergency
solutions. We can see that the problems of creditor free-riding and insufficient
relief remain, even in a situation widely acknowledged to be urgent. Recent
circumstances have also highlighted the increasing complexity of the sovereign
debt area, relative to previous decades—the multiplicity of debt instruments, the
varied institutional forms of investors, the geographical spread of creditors, and
the lack of transparency in all the above. The well-known statement that one
should “never waste a crisis” applies with full force to the current moment.
Before the energy and attention dissipate, it makes sense to set the foundations
40

Munevar, supra note 30.
For civil society group Eurodad’s assessment of the first iteration of the DSSI, see IOLANDA FRESNILLO,
THE G20 DEBT SERVICE SUSPENSION INITIATIVE: DRAINING OUT THE TITANIC WITH A BUCKET? 1, 2–23 (2020).
Eurodad and other civil society groups have held a similarly dim view of the ‘Common Framework’ extension.
See Julia Ravenscroft, Reaction to G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments: Designed By and For
Creditors, EURODAD (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.eurodad.org/reaction_to_g20_common_framework_for_
debt_treatments_designed_by_and_for_creditors.
41
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to deal more proactively with the next international debt crisis, if not avert it
altogether. In particular, the time has come for a commitment to what I call
‘disaggregated sovereign bankruptcy’—a framework by which multiple
processes at varying levels simultaneously support or instantiate a shared set of
sovereign debt resolution principles and commitments.
One threshold question that might arise here is: why “disaggregated”?
Would it not be better to recommit to a more centralized and maximalist
restructuring framework, perhaps revitalizing proposals from an earlier era, at
least to the extent that the willpower exists for such an endeavor? Or maybe
more can be done with market-based solutions, given sufficient global attention?
Perhaps. But one of the complications in the sovereign debt arena—as in so
many areas of policymaking—is that the key problems, actors, and plausible
solutions change over time. Such complexity and fluidity can make proposals
that once seemed appropriate appear outdated farther down the line. They also
suggest that the occasionally binary nature of discussions in sovereign debt
policy-making—market-based advancements versus statutory options—should
be set aside. Under the circumstances of complexity, fluidity, and uncertainty,
which do not appear likely to change in the foreseeable future, it is hard to know
which debt instruments or actors will be implicated and thus which approach
will be needed at any given moment. In this world, disaggregation should
perhaps be understood not as a defect or a compromised second-best but rather
as a virtue.
If this is the case, what are the ‘multiple processes at varying levels’ and
‘principles and commitments’ that underpin this vision of disaggregated
sovereign bankruptcy? To begin with, the basic principles and commitments in
this arena should not be very controversial; there is no call to reinvent the wheel
here. We need to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy of the
sovereign debt market and of debt restructuring events. Supporting these
overarching ideas, key sub-goals may include the promotion of preventive
restructuring; encouraging comprehensive and equitable creditor participation;
supporting realistic debt sustainability analysis; enabling standstills on litigation
where appropriate; enhancing the transparency of sovereign debt obligations and
restructurings; and improving markers and perceptions of sovereign debt
legitimacy, among others.42 To an important degree, the ‘multiple processes at
42
These cross-cutting goals, and this document more generally, are in line with the 2015 UNGA
Resolution establishing basic principles for sovereign debt restructuring as well as the April 2015 UNCTAD
‘Roadmap’ for Sovereign Debt Workouts. G.A. Res. 69/319, U.N. Doc. A/69/319 (Sept. 10, 2015); U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, Sovereign Debt Workouts: Going Forward 1, 3–5 (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsddf2015misc1_en.pdf. For more on what the elusive
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varying levels’ also already exist, at least in part. The tools for instantiating core
commitments might include contractual or market-based mechanisms, national
or provincial legislation, international legal guidelines and principles, and
measures that could be implemented by other international bodies, such as
through UN Security Council Resolutions or IMF measures, or eventually
perhaps a stand-alone statutory mechanism.
What could still exist more fully is a commitment to knitting these principles
and processes together, particularly at a global scale, and to explicitly conceiving
of them as complementary and deserving of simultaneous attention and support.
Instead of deciding whether to press forward with market-based measures,
alterations in domestic law, or international guidelines or semi-adjudicatory
procedures, it may well be the case that greater progress will be made across all
these tracks when they are pursued in parallel. To highlight one example worth
remembering, it appears that, until the early 2000s, New York–based market
actors were wary of incorporating even the most basic first-generation CACs
into New York law-governed bonds, despite their longstanding and widespread
use in United Kingdom–law bonds.43 However, the possibility of a more
muscular treaty-based mechanism for dealing with collective action problems,
raised with the presentation of the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM) proposal,44 corresponded to renewed declarations of fealty
to market-based solutions and a recommitment to updated contractual clauses.
In this case, a perception of competition may have proved a virtuous instigation
rather than a problem.
A more explicit and public shared commitment to ‘disaggregated
bankruptcy’ principles and processes could also have the benefit of making each
of these steps appear less solitary and less radical, and thus might make them
more likely. Statutorily-based domestic restructuring frameworks, such as for
business entities, have become widespread internationally—and, indeed, at least
some portion of the investors concerned about a more comprehensive (and less
voluntary) restructuring system for sovereign debt nonetheless actively
participate in domestic bankruptcy claims trading. Still, it can be difficult to act
alone or as a first mover in the international arena. National or sub-national
legislatures may not want to go out on a limb in embracing legislative
innovations, and practitioners could find comfort in making changes as part of a

concept of ‘legitimacy’ might mean in the sovereign debt context, see Lienau, supra note 24, at 151–214.
43
Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds
of Sovereign Borrowers 1, 1 (July 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
44
KRUEGER, supra note 4, at 31.
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broader community of actors moving in the same direction. Naming and sharing
a collective project—even a project spread across multiple levels and
processes—could help to spur on and facilitate that progressive movement.
V. COORDINATED DISAGGREGATION: THE BENEFITS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL
HOME
Disaggregated sovereign bankruptcy, as I have termed it, could conceivably
emerge from the natural patterns of international relations, perhaps catalyzed by
a change of outlook and discourse. However, any such emergence would likely
be painfully slow, less organized than ideal, and far from guaranteed. Instead, I
advocate for establishing an internationally oriented body to recommend,
coordinate, and facilitate steady, incremental progress in the architecture for
dealing with sovereign debt. Although any such institution obviously could not
contend with the immediate financial fallout of the pandemic, it would
nonetheless be a valuable outcome of the current moment.
This approach is closest in spirit to past recommendations for a semistructured international framework—one that aims to improve coordination and
strengthen shared principles and practices but still draws from institutional
mechanisms already in existence. It corresponds to the possibility of a Global
Debt Authority floated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in the first half of 2020.45 This prospect, still under
development, echoes other calls for a relatively modest but still internationally
relevant forum.46 To clarify, this coordinating authority would not be a fullblown multilateral organization with adjudicative functions along the lines of
the IMF’s earlier SDRM proposal.47 Instead, a more modest institution could be
established, perhaps even by a smaller number of states and supporters, to serve
as a focal point for ongoing activities designed to improve how the global
community collectively deals with debt in the short/emergency term, medium

45
Alonso Soto, New Global Body to Help with Debt Relief, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-22/un-to-call-for-new-global-body-to-help-with-debt-relief.
46
One earlier proposal called for an even less formalized “Sovereign Debt Forum” more focused on
research and prevention efforts and on bringing together creditors and debtors at an early stage, structured as a
private, incorporated, non-profit organization. RICHARD GITLIN & BRETT HOUSE, A BLUEPRINT FOR A
SOVEREIGN DEBT FORUM 7 (2014). An interdisciplinary, academically based research hub of the same name has
been recently launched, which could serve as a partner in certain of the GDA’s activities. An earlier UNCTAD
Roadmap and Guide from 2015 also recommended, in broad strokes, an independent “Debt Workout Institution”
along these lines that can be understood as a precursor to the proposal currently under development. The
Roadmap suggested that a higher degree of legitimacy would result from a more coordinated multilateral
establishment of any such body. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 42, at 62–63.
47
KRUEGER, supra note 4, at 31.
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term, and long term. This authority would work toward operationalizing the
substantive goals noted above in particular situations, pushing forward and
coordinating developments at the contractual level, domestic legislative level,
and international level––either in establishing soft-law guidelines or in the
development of more enforceable hard-law multilateral or minilateral
legislation.
As part of this larger mission, it could serve as an idea generator and home
for orphaned proposals—worthy ideas formulated during a crisis (such as the
present one) but then set aside as the international community shifts its focus to
other problems in the news cycle. While higher-level attention is directed
elsewhere, a dedicated debt institution could establish work streams to combine
and then refine proposals in the same topic family—for example around
domestic legislation to address collective action problems, support for debt
transparency, protection of financial market infrastructure, or emergency
standstills. If the authority were working on nationally-based but coordinated
emergency standstill legislation, it might formulate and negotiate appropriate
and shared triggers for emergency measures. It could formally endorse model
laws, establish relationships with those actors that might be in a position to
implement them, and have both the substance and the processes at the ready for
when the moment is right. Furthermore, as part of its ongoing and incremental
work, it could revisit and update past proposals and recommend their further
consideration or adoption when appropriate.
As should be clear from the foregoing, part of this body’s work would be to
identify, cultivate, and coordinate the cross-cutting tools, actors, and networks
that might best achieve substantive goals. Such actors and alliances could
include national/provincial/supranational legislator groups; international and
national associations centered around insolvency professionals and judges;
creditor groups such as the IIF and ICMA; bond trustee institutions; market
utilities such as payment clearing systems; UNCITRAL and other bodies active
in legislative coordination; civil society organizations; and subject matter
experts. Many others would, of course, be relevant depending on the goals, tools,
and processes under consideration. To be sure, certain of these networks exist to
some degree already, through fairly regular academic, policy, and
interdisciplinary conferences. Still, they could be further formalized and
extended, particularly to include actors and groupings important for progress in
these arenas but not already deeply attentive to and involved in sovereign debt
matters. Similarly, other international organizations undertake certain of these
activities at various times, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and UNCTAD, or
even private creditor groups like the IIF. However, they can be limited by their
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broader missions, attentiveness to other issues, and concomitant political
constraints. In some instances, they also may be considered insufficiently neutral
due to their financial interests, affiliations, and positions in global economic and
political relations.
Indeed, one striking feature of the sovereign debt arena is the absence of a
natural institutional home for important debt-relevant proposals. An example of
this is the occasional homelessness of initiatives that are widely acknowledged
to be valuable, such as a truly global ‘sovereign debt registry’ to make core
information more transparent and widely accessible. The IMF would have been
a natural location but declined, seemingly on the basis of political delicacies—
and, indeed, its goals going forward could tie even more deeply into changing
sensitivities engendered by the shifting balance of global economic power. A
private creditor organization would be less than ideal, and indeed the IIF’s own
debt transparency principles leave many key indicators out.48 An academic
institution is unlikely to carry sufficient weight, and of course the commitment
of any academic institution shifts with the make-up and interests of particular
faculty members.49 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has launched an initiative to develop a data platform,
which could be promising but may prove insufficient, particularly given that it
builds upon and does not purport to extend the IIF approach.50 As such, a
purpose-built international debt authority could serve as an informational hub or
repository for accessible, comprehensive, and comprehensible sovereign debtrelated information. This could include developing and maintaining databases
for, for example, debt restructuring agreements, debt sustainability analyses, and
of course a central sovereign debt registry, perhaps in conjunction with the
OECD. Other valuable initiatives and proposals that may emerge down the line
deserve a swifter and more secure positive response.
CONCLUSION
While the ongoing economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has
48
See INST. FOR INT’L FIN., VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES FOR DEBT TRANSPARENCY 1, 2–5 (2019),
https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/Principles%20for%20Debt%20Transparency.pdf. For an overview of
shortcomings, see U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., UNCTAD COMMENT ON IIF DRAFT VOLUNTARY
PRINCIPLES FOR DEBT TRANSPARENCY 1, 5–11 (2019) (on file with author).
49
The Euro-Mediterranean Economists Association has just launched a debt transparency platform
advocating for a global sovereign debt registry. It is at an early stage and would likely benefit from broader
support and perhaps a more explicit connection to other initiatives. DEBT TRANSPARENCY PLATFORM,
https://dtransparency.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2021).
50
OECD Debt Transparency Initiative, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/oecddebt-transparency-initiative.htm (last visited April 24, 2021).
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generated important proposals for addressing countries’ financial distress, it has
also made even more apparent the existing gaps in the international financial
architecture. In addition, it has highlighted the extent to which the international
community pays closest attention to the sovereign debt infrastructure in
situations of crisis—well past the ideal time to develop and implement necessary
improvements. In this Essay, I have suggested that, as part of the discussion of
how to deal with the pandemic’s financial fallout, we should explicitly adopt
what might be called disaggregated sovereign bankruptcy. Such an approach
would not favor one mechanism over another and indeed would explicitly
embrace the potentially complementary rather than competitive nature of
progress along different tracks. It makes particular sense given that a single
adjudicative mechanism remains politically unattainable and may not even be
appropriate given the complexity of the current international debt market.
To support disaggregated bankruptcy, the international community should
ideally establish a corollary institution. A global authority along these lines
could act as a base and catalyst for developing and implementing incremental
improvements to the sovereign debt arena across a range of levels and
mechanisms, guided by a shared set of principles and commitments. Ideally,
debtors, creditors, and the international community writ large would eventually
have a regularly updated menu of prepared options ready to be put into action
whenever needed—even as we hope that the time of need never comes.

